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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the thesis is to analyze real ACAS surveillance parameters and find out whether 
the surveillance function of the system works according to technical standards. It uses a 
MATLAB simulation to simulate real air traffic situations. The output of the simulation is 
compared with real ADS-B data and further analyzed. Therefore it is focused on selected 
parameters which can be easily modeled and which contribute to the overall 1030/1090 MHz 
radio frequency saturation. In the last part of this thesis several amendments to the official 
ACAS surveillance algorithms, which would help lowering the radio frequency saturation, are 
suggested. 
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Cílem této diplomové práce je analýza reálných přehledových parametrů systému ACAS a 
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1 Introduction 
The volume of air transport has a growing trend over the long term and therefore air traffic 
density is much higher than it used to be even a few years ago. The airspace becomes 
extremely dense especially in approach and terminal control areas around big airports and 
also on the most frequent air routes. Due to this fact there is naturally a higher risk of midair 
collision. Hence the requirements for the correct and precise functioning of the airborne 
collision systems are very strict.  
The surveillance function of every airborne collision system is responsible for ensuring that 
positions of all aircraft in vicinity with adequate equipment will be known to the system as 
well as ensuring that own aircraft’s position will be known to all adequately equipped aircraft 
in vicinity. This requires a kind of communication between all systems, which is done by 
sending either 56 bites or 112 bites messages on RF 1030/1090 MHz. All interrogations are 
transmitted on 1030 MHz while replies to these interrogations use 1090 MHz. Since this 
frequency band is not used solely by airborne collision systems to exchange air-to-air 
messages but also by secondary ground radars to exchange ground-to-air and air-to-ground 
messages, it is not only air traffic which is becoming saturated, but also the 1030/1090 MHz 
frequency band. Seeing that the usage of a new frequency band to lower the saturation of 
the current one is not at all feasible as it would require an extremely costly adjustment to all 
systems currently being used, it is necessary to monitor and analyze the RF 1030/1090 MHz 
saturation and deliver changes, which would help to lower the saturation while keeping the 
system’s safety a priority.  
In this Master’s thesis I am going to analyze the real parameters of ACAS surveillance 
function. It is a continuation of my Bachelor’s thesis where I have described in detail how the 
surveillance function of airborne collision systems shall work according to standards and 
where I have also described the various types of messages used by the system and the 
information they transmit. In this work I am going to turn this theory into practice and find out 
whether the real system really works as defined by the standards. I will also try to analyze 
the real parameters of the system which are not firmly defined by standards but can differ 
according to the particular manufacturer of the system.  
Firstly an aircraft model will be created in Simulink so as it is possible to simulate real air 
traffic situations. Then an ACAS surveillance function simulation, which will be based on the 
description provided in my Bachelor’s thesis, will be coded in MATLAB and will take aircraft 
flight data from the Simulink model. The outputs of the simulation will be then compared with 
10 
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real data which were received at ADS-B receivers owned by the Czech Technical University 
in Prague. The comparison of the outputs will be used for further analysis of the system’s 
real parameters. At the end I will try to suggest some changes based on the results of the 
analysis which might be beneficial for the process of lowering the saturation of 1030/1090 
MHz radio frequency. 
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2 Airborne Collision 
Avoidance System 
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is an airborne avionic system used to mitigate 
the risk of midair collision. The system tracks aircraft in vicinity through messages that are 
transmitted among them. If a risk of collision is detected, ACAS first issues Traffic Advisory 
(TA) to highlight the intruder on the cockpit screen and provide voice alert. In case that the 
risk still persists a Resolution Advisory (RA) is issued. This gives the pilots instructions for a 
proper maneuver to avoid the collision. [4] 
In some literature ACAS is sometimes called TCAS (Traffic Alerts and Collision Avoidance 
System). There is a slight difference between those two terms as ACAS usually refers to a 
set of standards and recommended practices, while TCAS usually refers to a specific 
implementation of ACAS in an aircraft. In this document I will not distinguish between these 
two terms and will always use the term ACAS. [4] 
There are currently 3 types of ACAS, but not all of them are in use: 
 ACAS I, 
 ACAS II and 
 ACAS III. 
ACAS I does not have the capability of RA so it is not able to provide instructions for the best 
maneuver to avoid a collision. ACAS II is the type which is currently being used and can 
provide both TA and RA (vertical only). ACAS III has not been deployed yet. It provides both 
vertical and horizontal RA. [4] 
ACAS II is further divided into several versions. The version being commonly used nowadays 
is ACAS II version 7.1. Therefore, this document is focused on this version of ACAS. [4] 
2.1 Surveillance function 
In order to recognize the aircraft’s position and issue a possible TA or RA, it is necessary to 
interrogate all aircraft in vicinity and listen to their replies. To accomplish this, it is not solely 
ACAS which is used, but also an aircraft transponder (XPNDR). ACAS’s role is to interrogate 
aircraft in vicinity, while aircraft XPNDR is used to reply to these interrogations. These two 
systems are therefore both necessary to make the tracking functional. ACAS is composed of 
3 subsystems: surveillance function, logic unit and antennae. [7]  
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XPNDR can work in 2 different modes: 
 Mode C and 
 Mode S. 
Messages in Mode C can be transmitted to all aircraft in range while messages in Mode S 
are selective and thus it is possible to transmit a message to one particular aircraft in a way 
that no other aircraft will respond to it. For this purpose every Mode S equipped aircraft is 
assigned a unique 24 bits Mode S address which remains the same throughout the entire 
aircraft life. Therefore the aircraft can be easily identified. The vast majority of today’s 
commercial aircraft are equipped with Mode S XPNDR. This is the reason why messages 
transmitted in this mode are the core interest of this work. It is also necessary to mention that 
all Mode S equipped aircraft must support both Mode S and Mode C messages to ensure 
that even aircraft not supporting Mode S messages can be tracked. [7]     
For the purposes of the ACAS surveillance function simulation, which is going to be made 
and described later in this document, it is necessary to further divide Mode S equipped 
aircraft to aircraft which are ACAS hybrid surveillance capable, aircraft which are ADS-B 
equipped and aircraft which are not equipped with ADS-B and have no ACAS hybrid 
surveillance capability. 
Aircraft with ACAS hybrid surveillance can passively track ADS-B aircraft by listening to the 
extended squitters which are periodically transmitted at a given transmission rate and by 
validation of these ES at rates specified in standards. Aircraft with no ACAS hybrid 
surveillance must track other aircraft actively by interrogating them and listening to their 
replies. [7] 
2.2 Applicable standards and legislation 
The requirements for airborne collision avoidance systems are stated in ICAO Annex 10 
(volume IV). The technical specifications are defined in RTCA DO-185 and RTCA DO-300 
(hybrid surveillance) standards or in relevant European EUROCAE standards.   
The mandate in Europe which is valid at the time when this document is being written is as 
follows. 
“The carriage of ACAS II version 7.0 has been mandated in Europe since 1 January 2005 by 
all civil fixed-wing turbine-engined aircraft having a maximum take-off mass exceeding 5700 
kg or a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more than 19. 
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Amendments 85 to ICAO Annex 10 (volume IV) published in October 2010 introduced a 
provision stating that all new ACAS installations after 1 January 2014 shall be compliant with 
version 7.1 and after 1 January 2017 all ACAS units shall be compliant with version 7.1. 
In December 2011, the European Commission published an Implementing Rule mandating 
the carriage of ACAS II version 7.1 within European Union airspace earlier than the dates 
stipulated in ICAO Annex 10: from 1 December 2015 by all civil aircraft with a maximum 
certified take-off mass over 5700 kg or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers, with the 
exception of unmanned aircraft systems.” [4] 
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3 Simulation 
3.1 Aircraft model 
Prior to the simulation of ACAS surveillance function, an aircraft model has to be created. It 
is obvious that for any kind of traffic collision avoidance system simulation at least 2 aircraft 
are needed to be modeled. In the following paragraphs I am going to describe an aircraft 
model that I have used for my simulation. This aircraft model can be then copied multiple 
times depending on the number of aircraft we want to use for the simulation. After copying 
the aircraft, different initial conditions can be assigned to each of them. 
For this kind of simulation it is sufficient to use a simplified aircraft model as the advanced 
flight properties do not have any significant influence on the ACAS function itself. The only 
parameters that need to be controlled are initial coordinates, heading, flight path angle, bank 
angle and velocity. For this reason it is possible to consider the following simplifications: 
 The Earth is flat. Taking into account the distances flown by aircraft during the 
simulation, this is quite true. [16] 
 Each aircraft is considered as a single point with its mass. The mass is constant 
throughout the simulation. [16] 
 Neither vertical nor horizontal wind components are being considered. 
 Wing lifting mechanism such as flaps, slots etc. is not considered in any phase of 
flight during the simulation. 
The aircraft model can be mathematically described by kinematic and mechanical differential 
equations. 
3.1.1 Kinematic equations 
If x is considered as East axis and y as North axis, it is possible to write: 
)sin(
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Where: 
Vp is True Air Speed. 
α is Flight Path angle. 
β is Heading. 
The kinematic equations are based on the charts in figure 1. 
If the heading equals 0 (in a straight ahead flight), then it is possible to determine equation 
(II). 
)tan(
dx
dz
            (II) 
 
Figure 1 Determination of kinematic equations 
3.1.2 Mechanical equations 
Taking into account figure 2, it is possible to write: 
)cos(
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m
p
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        (III) 
Where: 
m is the mass of the aircraft and is considered as a constant. 
g is the gravitational acceleration considered as 9.81 m/s2. 
T is the thrust of the engines. 
D is the total drag of the aircraft. 
L is the total lift of the aircraft. 
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Figure 2 Determination of mechanical equations 
If γ is considered to be a bank angle, then the equation (IV) may be determined. 
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3.1.3 Final set of equations 
Knowing the fact that the horizontal nx and vertical nz load factor can be determined 
according to the equations (V) and (VI), it is possible to derive the final set of equations (VII) 
which are used to mathematically describe an aircraft flight. [16]  
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3.1.4 Software model of aircraft 
Since the entire simulation is going to be coded in MATLAB, I decided to create the aircraft 
model in Simulink which is a block diagram environment. Because of its tight integration with 
MATLAB environment, it can be easily used to generate aircraft flight data for MATLAB 
script. Hence the simulation of ACAS surveillance function which is coded in MATLAB will be 
based (and will take all of the aircraft flight data from it) on Simulink model. 
To model an aircraft in Simulink using equations (VII) it is essential to use 7 types of blocks. 
These blocks are: 
 Trigonometric function (the input is an angle and the output is a trigonometric function 
of this angle), 
 Product (multiplication of 2 or more inputs), 
 Integrator (integrates its input), 
 Constant, 
 Add (ads and subtracts 2 or more inputs), 
 Out (sends the outputs of the model to another workspace), 
 To Workspace (sends the outputs of the model to MATLAB workspace). 
If those blocks are connected according to the relations in equations (VII), the model is 
functional (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Aircraft model in Simulink 
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3.2 Simulation of ACAS surveillance function 
As it was already said before, the ACAS surveillance function is simulated in MATLAB 
software and uses aircraft flight data which are generated in Simulink aircraft model. The 
simulation itself consists of a set of several functions and two scripts which are going to be 
described in this chapter. 
3.2.1 Scripts 
3.2.1.1 initial_conditions 
As is apparent from its name, this script is used for entering the initial conditions of all the 
aircraft that are going to be modeled. The set of initial conditions for each aircraft is as 
follows: 
 ix – x-coordinate of the aircraft’s initial position. 
 iy – y-coordinate of the aircraft’s initial position. 
 iz – z-coordinate of the aircraft’s initial position (initial altitude). 
 Vp – initial value of True Air Speed in knots. 
 Beta – heading (see chapter 3.1.1). 
 Alfa – flight path angle (see chapter 3.1.1). 
 Gama – bank angle (see chapter 3.1.1). 
 Nz – vertical load factor. 
 Nx – horizontal load factor. 
 TCAS – indicates whether ACAS is switched on (1) or switched off (2). 
 AQ – indicates whether the aircraft is equipped with transponder working in mode S 
and whether the ACAS is without hybrid surveillance capability (1) or not (2). If the 
aircraft is equipped with Mode S transponder and with ACAS hybrid surveillance 
capability, then both AQ and HS shall indicate (1). All possible combinations of 
equipage initial conditions are stated in table 1. 
 HS – indicates whether the aircraft is equipped with Mode S transponder and ACAS 
with hybrid surveillance capability (1) or not (2). 
 ADSB – if this initial condition is set to (1), it indicates that the aircraft is equipped with 
ADS-B (mode S transponder with extended squitter capability). Hence if ADSB 
indicates one (1), then AQ shall also indicate one (1). 
20 
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 ModeC – indicates whether the aircraft is equipped with only Mode C transponder (1) 
or not (2). In most of the cases, this initial condition should indicate (2). 
Each of these initial conditions in the script has its index according to the aircraft this 
particular initial condition belongs to (for example ix1 means it is an initial x-coordinate of the 
first aircraft, Gama5 means it is a bank angle of the fifth aircraft etc.). If the aircraft’s ACAS is 
switched on it must also be equipped with a transponder of any of the described types.  
Table 1 All possible equipment combinations 
Scenario Description 
TCAS=1, AQ=1, HS=2, ADSB=2, ModeC=2 The aircraft is equipped with mode S 
transponder but has neither ADS-B nor 
hybrid surveillance capability. 
TCAS=1, AQ=1, HS=2, ADSB=1, ModeC=2 The aircraft is equipped with mode S 
transponder, has ADS-B, but no hybrid 
surveillance capability. 
TCAS=1, AQ=2, HS=1, ADSB=2, ModeC=2 The aircraft is equipped with mode S 
transponder and is both ADS-B and hybrid 
surveillance capable. 
TCAS=1, AQ=2, HS=2, ADSB=2, ModeC=1 The aircraft is equipped with only mode C 
transponder. 
TCAS=2, AQ=2, HS=2, ADSB=2, ModeC=2 The aircraft does not have a transponder 
nor ACAS. 
 
Except the initial conditions, this script also contains the unit conversions and general 
settings of the simulation: 
 time_step, 
 whisper_shout_rate, 
 acas_range, 
 nominal_surveillance. 
It is recommended not to change the unit conversions and time step value (time step value 
has no direct impact on the simulation). However, if it is for any reason changed, the value of 
time step must also be changed in Simulink aircraft model.  
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The default value of whisper shout rate is 6. This represents the minimum number of whisper 
shout messages in one sequence according to the RTCA standard. If a higher number of 
messages in one sequence is expected, then this value can be easily changed here. [1] 
ACAS range initial condition allows us to define the range at which the system will be 
functional. Hence if the range between any two of the modeled aircraft is higher than the 
value of acas_range, the ACAS surveillance function simulation will not count any messages. 
Nominal surveillance defines the transmission rate of DF0 messages. The default value is 5 
seconds. According to the RTCA standard, the aircraft shall interrogate each other at least 
once per 5 seconds, therefore the value shall never be greater than 5. [1] 
After all the initial conditions are defined, the script can be run. This will store the initial 
values in the workspace variables and make these variables accessible by Simulink. The 
aircraft model which is made in Simulink can now be open. After setting the time of 
simulation (in seconds), the Simulink model can be run. This will store new array variables in 
the workspace. These new variables (matrices) represent the sample values of flight 
properties such as coordinates, bank angle, heading etc. throughout the entire flight during 
the simulation time. It is obvious that the number of sample values depends on the simulation 
time and time step. The longer simulation time the more sample values but the higher time 
step, the less sample values we get.  
3.2.1.2 main_file 
This script launches all the functions which are used to do the necessary calculations needed 
to determine the number and type of messages transmitted among all the modeled aircraft. It 
is important not to change any part of the code in this script. Few minutes (in some cases it 
may take 5-10 minutes depending on the complexity of the situation which is being 
simulated) after running this script, the following graphs will appear in separate windows: 
 aircraft’s flight overview in 2-D, 
 aircraft’s flight overview in 3-D, 
 bar chart showing the number of all transmitted messages (DF11, DF17, DF0, DF16, 
UF0/UF16 and Mode C Only All Call), 
 bar chart showing the number of all transmitted messages in detail. 
Running the script will also store new workspace variables which, in fact, define the number 
of all transmitted messages. It is possible to call these variables in MATLAB command 
window and thus see the exact number of transmitted messages of a specific message type. 
These variables are as follows: 
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 DF11 (all Acquisition Squitter messages transmitted by all the modeled aircraft which 
are equipped with Mode S transponder), 
 DF17 (all extended squitter messages transmitted by all the modeled aircraft which 
are equipped with Mode S transponder and ADS-B), 
 ModeC_Only_All_Call (all Mode C messages transmitted by all the modeled aircraft), 
 sumES_APS (all transmitted Airborne Position Squitter messages), 
 sumES_AVS (all transmitted Airborne Velocity Squitter messages), 
 sumES_AIS (all transmitted Aircraft Identification Squitter messages), 
 DF0 (all transmitted DF0 messages), 
 UF0 (all transmitted UF0/UF16 messages), 
 DF16 (all transmitted DF16 messages), 
 UF16_count (all transmitted UF16 messages which are used to count the number of 
aircraft in vicinity if the aircraft is flying below FL180). [7] 
3.2.2 Functions 
Functions are used to make the necessary calculations needed to determine the number of 
transmissions among all the modeled aircraft and are launched by running the main_file 
script. It is very important that all the functions are stored in the same folder as main_file 
script which is used to call them.  
3.2.2.1 range_calculation 
As is apparent from the function name, this function calculates ranges at each time step 
among all the modeled aircraft. The function is divided into 6 sections. The 1st section is used 
to calculate ranges among all modeled aircraft no matter what their equipment is like, the 2nd 
section calculates ranges among all mode S (AQ) equipped aircraft, 3rd section calculates 
ranges among all mode S (HS) equipped aircraft, the 4th section calculates ranges among all 
mode S equipped aircraft, the 5th section calculates ranges among all aircraft which are only 
Mode C equipped and finally the last section is used to calculate ranges among all mode S 
equipped aircraft with no ACAS hybrid surveillance. These ranges are used as inputs in the 
other functions. 
The function also controls whether a particular aircraft is located within ACAS range 
detection of other aircraft. This ACAS range is defined in the initial conditions script as 
described earlier in this chapter. Hence if the range between any 2 modeled aircraft is higher 
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than acas_range, then those aircraft will not interrogate each other and thus no messages 
will be counted. 
3.2.2.2 modeS_AQ  
This function calculates the number of messages that are transmitted by mode S equipped 
aircraft. Hence it counts the number of DF11 (acquisition squitter), UF0/UF16 (short/long 
ACAS interrogation), DF0 (short ACAS reply to UF0) and DF16 (long ACAS reply to UF16) 
messages, eventually DF17 messages if the particular aircraft is equipped with ADS-B. The 
interrogation rates are set in accordance with the RTCA standards and are shown in tables 
below (table 2, table 3 and table 4). [1] 
Table 2 DF11 transmission rate 
Message type Period [s] 
DF11 (acquisition squitter) 1 
 
Table 3 UF0/UF16 interrogation rates 
Message type Period [s] Condition 
UF0 No interrogation One of the aircraft is on the ground and the 
other is more than 2000 ft. above ground 
level. 
UF0 10 The aircraft’s altitude separation is equal to 
or higher than 10000 ft. 
UF16 1 In case of active TA or RA. 
UF0 5 The aircraft which is being interrogated is 
below FL180. 
UF0 <=5 In all other cases. Since the RTCA standard 
does not specify a particular value but only 
mandates that the aircraft shall be 
interrogated at least every 5 seconds, this 
value can be set according to a particular 
situation in initial conditions script. 
 
Table 4 DF17 transmission rates 
Type of ES message Period [s] 
Aircraft Identification Squitter 5 
Airborne Position Squitter 0.5 
Airborne Velocity Squitter 0.5 
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In addition to the interrogation rates described in table 3, the aircraft is interrogated at a rate 
of once per second if equation (VIII) is met. Since such a situation is not common in reality, 
this condition was not added into this function. 
2
min( 6 , )
SMOD
r
rTAU
kt rdot

 

          (VIII) 
Where: 
r is the tracked angle. 
rdot is the estimated relative range rate. 
SMOD is a surveillance distance modifier which for this purpose shall be equivalent to 3 NM. 
[1] 
For the purposes of this simulation it is considered that for every interrogation (uplink format 
message) the aircraft always receives a reply (downlink format message). Therefore the 
number of uplink format messages is always equal to the number of downlink format 
messages. 
I had described in detail how the aircraft interrogate each other according to different 
situations in my Bachelor’s thesis.  
3.2.2.3 modeS_ES 
The modeS_ES function is used to determine the number of extended squitter messages 
(DF17) as well as the messages which are sent to validate information contained in ES 
(UF0/UF16 and DF16).  
For the simplification of this simulation it is considered that if the aircraft’s ACAS has hybrid 
surveillance capability, then it is also equipped with ADS-B and thus the transponder is 
capable to send extended squitter messages. In reality, this is true in most of the cases. 
The function deals with 3 types of extended squitter messages, which are shown together 
with the interrogation rates in table 4. 
Since the simulation only deals with airborne aircraft, Surface Position Squitter is not 
counted. 
Information contained in DF17 messages are validated by sending either UF0 or UF16 
validation messages. As it is not easy to determine whether the validation message will be in 
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short (UF0) or long (UF16) format, this simulation does not distinguish them and count them 
together as UF0/UF16 in the outputs. 
Reply to the validation message is always in a long format (DF16). This is because there is 
an RL field in the validation message which always equals 1 no matter if a short or long 
surveillance message was transmitted. This means that the long message is required as a 
reply. [7] 
The interrogation rate of UF16/DF16 messages, intended to validate the information 
contained in the ES, depends on the range between the aircraft. 
If equation (IX) is met, the interrogation rate is 1 second and the aircraft is considered as a 
NEAR THREAT. The interrogation rate is 10 seconds if equation (X) is met. The aircraft is 
then considered as a THREAT. If none of those equations is met, then the interrogation rate 
is 60 seconds. [13] 
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Where: 
a is intruder altitude separation in feet. 
ȧ is altitude rate in feet/second. 
r is intruder slant range in NM. 
ṙ is range rate in NM/second. 
3.2.2.4 modeS_ADSBHS 
This function is called in case there are 2 or more aircraft being simulated, where some of 
those aircraft are HS capable and some are not (they have only ADS-B). In such a scenario, 
the HS capable aircraft will validate the position data contained in ES by UF0/UF16 validation 
messages. Aircraft with no HS capability will interrogate other aircraft with UF0 nominal 
surveillance. 
3.2.2.5 modeC 
This is the last transponder mode which has not been covered in the simulation yet. If the 
aircraft’s transponder does not work in Mode S, it has to interrogate all other aircraft in 
vicinity with Mode C Only All Call format messages which are sent once per second. In 
reality, these messages are transmitted by all aircraft no matter the transponder mode, as 
every aircraft must ensure it will get replies from aircraft only equipped with a Mode C 
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transponder. This function performs calculations to get the number of those messages 
throughout the entire time of simulation. [1] 
3.2.2.6 other_messages 
If a mode S equipped aircraft is flying below FL180, it sends UF16 messages at least once 
every 10 seconds in order to count the number of aircraft in vicinity. This function calculates 
the number of these messages which are sent throughout the entire time of simulation. [1] [7] 
3.2.2.7 Number_of_messages 
In this function all the messages are summed up. Hence, it allows us to call a specific 
message type and get the total count of transmitted messages of this type.  
3.2.2.8 aircraft_plot 
This provides the 2-D and 3-D plots showing the flight paths of all the modeled aircraft. The 
2-D plot is divided into 2 subplots. The first one shows the flights in x-y coordinates, the other 
one shows the same flights in x-z coordinates. 
3.2.2.9 messages_plot 
2 plots appear by calling this function. The first plot is a bar chart showing the number of all 
transmitted messages (UF0/UF16, DF0, DF16, DF11, DF17, Mode C Only All Call) during 
the entire simulation time, the other plot shows in detail the number of transmitted DF0, DF17 
and DF16 messages.  
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4 Data analysis 
In this chapter I am going to analyze real ACAS surveillance parameters. The analysis will be 
done by comparing real data (messages) which had been received by our ADS-B receivers 
to the output of the MATLAB simulation. Since the MATLAB simulation is based on published 
standards, using this approach it should be possible to find out whether the real data are in 
compliance with the standardized simulation output or not and determine possible 
differences. 
4.1 Real data 
The real data are taken from ADS-B receivers owned by the Czech Technical University. 
These receivers are made in a way so they can only be used to receive messages in 
downlink format and therefore the message types which can be utilized for this analysis are: 
DF11, DF17, DF0 and DF16. 
The configuration of CTU receivers consists of 4 ADS-B receiver units which are located in 
and near Prague. Their exact location and technical properties will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The configuration of 4 ADS-B receivers allows us to receive high amount of messages 
transmitted by aircraft within range and thus make a precise analysis. Moreover, it allows us 
to use the configuration as a MLAT system for surveillance purposes. As it is very likely that 
we receive the same message (with the same data) at more than 1 receiver at a time, it is 
necessary to filter this duplicate data. For this purpose I have used a MATLAB program 
made by another student who had been working on the same project. This program helps to 
get rid of the duplicate data and it can also make a fusion of data from different ADS-B 
receivers so that there is only one file to deal with. [6] 
This real data will be used in the next chapter for further analysis and comparison with the 
output obtained in the simulation.  
The location of all four ADS-B receivers is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Location of ADS-B receivers 
4.1.1 Strahov receiver 
The Strahov receiver is located on the roof of the Block 11 building of the Strahov dormitory 
complex. Since Strahov is on top of the Petřín hill, the receiver has a large range of message 
reception (as shown in figure 5) and thus can receive messages from faraway aircraft. 
Different colors in the picture are used to show the difference in range of receiver reception 
in different altitudes (light green: 0-9999 ft, green: 10000-19999 ft, magenta: 20000-29999 ft, 
red: 30000 ft and above). Detailed information about this receiver are stated in table 5. [6] 
 
Figure 5 Strahov receiver range 
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Table 5 Strahov receiver information 
Receiver number (figure 4) 1 
Receiver name Strahov receiver 
Latitude 50.080512805 
Longitude 14.395710655 
Altitude 338.33 
 
4.1.2 Pankrác receiver 
The receiver is located on top of a skyscraper in the Pankrác district. As shown in figure 6 it 
is only able to receive messages coming from the west. Detailed information about this 
receiver are stated in table 6. 
 
Figure 6 Pankrác receiver range 
Table 6 Pankrác receiver information 
Receiver number (figure 4) 2 
Receiver name Pankrác receiver 
Latitude 50.050384622 
Longitude 14.436212947 
Altitude 377.21 
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4.1.3 Letňany Airport receiver 
This receiver is located at Letňany Airport and there are no obstacles in the vicinity. For this 
reason it is appropriate to use it to receive messages from long range aircraft (figure 7). 
Table 7 provides detailed information about this receiver. 
 
Figure 7 Letňany Airport receiver range 
Table 7 Letňany Airport receiver information 
Receiver number (figure 4) 3 
Receiver name Letňany Airport receiver 
Latitude 50.129189 
Longitude 14.525771 
Altitude 285.0 
 
4.1.4 Prague Airport receiver 
This is our newest receiver. It is located at the top of the APC building of Prague Airport. Its 
former location was our faculty building but it had been shielded from one side and therefore 
had to be moved to another place. Information about this receiver can be found in table 8. 
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Table 8 Prague Airport receiver information 
Receiver number (figure 4) 4 
Receiver name LKPR receiver 
Latitude 50.106222 
Longitude 14.273418 
Altitude 208.62 
 
 
Figure 8 Prague Airport receiver range 
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4.2 Comparison of simulation output with real data 
In this chapter I am going to compare the simulation output with real data received by our 
ADS-B receivers and then evaluate whether the real system works as described by 
standards. The comparison will be done on real air traffic situations. The information about 
each aircraft in a situation will be taken from the internet application www.planefinder.net 
which shows live air traffic as well as past air traffic with all the needed information (time, 
mode-S address, altitude, velocity etc.) and thus is a perfect tool to find a convenient aircraft 
arrangement which can be easily simulated and analyzed.  
4.2.1 Situation 1 
4.2.1.1 Description and initial conditions 
In this situation there are 3 aircraft with different equipment (table 9) and thus different 
messages are transmitted. All aircraft in this situation have hybrid surveillance capability (no 
DF0 messages were received but only DF16 messages). This means that the aircraft will use 
DF16 messages as a reply to the UF0/UF16 position validation messages. Apparently, all 
aircraft are also equipped with ADS-B. The simulation information are stated in table 10. 
Table 9 Situation 1: aircraft information 
 Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft 3 
Type of aircraft B737-82R A321-211(SL) B737-86N 
Age of aircraft 7 years 8 months 18 years 
Company (airline) Pegasus Airlines Aeroflot Russian A. Pegasus Airlines 
Mode-S address 4B85B0 42434D 4B8432 
Altitude 35000 ft 34975 ft 37000 ft 
Velocity 516 kts 491 kts 517 kts 
X-coordinate 0 28 6.5 
Y-coordinate 0 -15.5 -27 
Bearing 328° 30° 333° 
Transponder capability ES capable ES capable ES capable 
Hybrid s. capability HS capable HS capable HS capable 
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Table 10 Situation 1: simulation information 
Date and time 09.03.2018 01:30 CET 
Number of aircraft 3 
Time duration of simulation 3 minutes 
ACAS range 40 NM 
Nominal surveillance rate 5 seconds 
Whisper-shout sequence 6 
 
The situation at 01:30 CET when the simulation starts as shown on www.planefinder.net is 
depicted in figure 9 and the same situation at the end of simulation (at 01:33 CET) as shown 
on www.planefinder.net is depicted in figure 10. 
 
Figure 9 Situation 1: initial aircraft position 
 
Figure 10 Situation 1: final aircraft position 
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The aircraft’s initial conditions (altitude, velocity, position, equipment etc.) have been inserted 
to the aircraft model. The output is shown in figure 11. The aircraft flight paths in this figure 
correspond to the real situation shown in figure 9 and figure 10, so the simulation used to 
count the transmitted messages can be now run. 
 
Figure 11 Situation 1: simulated aircraft position 
4.2.1.2 Simulation outputs 
Number of all transmitted messages according to the simulation (which is made based on 
standards) distinguished by type is shown in figure 12. As all aircraft in this situation have 
hybrid surveillance capability and are equipped with ADS-B, no DF0 messages were 
transmitted. 
Number of all transmitted DF17 messages is depicted in figure 13. All DF16 messages were 
transmitted at a rate of once per 10 seconds. 
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Figure 12 Situation 1: simulation outputs 
 
Figure 13 Situation 1: number of DF17 messages 
4.2.1.3 Real data analysis 
The analysis of DF16 messages that were received by the ADS-B receivers is presented in 
table 11. At the top, there is a mode S address of an aircraft which sent the messages listed 
below. Message pairs relating to each other have the same color (this was determined from 
the sequence pattern). As we can see, the reply rate of all messages is 10 seconds which 
corresponds with the simulation output. According to the table, there are 8 messages that 
were not received at any of our receivers and so they are missing from the message 
sequence. Since it is clear that these messages must have been transmitted and they were 
just not received by our receivers, they will be manually added to the final number. Messages 
which were transmitted out of the sequence pattern have no background in the table. Two of 
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them (at times 5419.675 and 5508.629) are probably just duplicates of previous messages 
and therefore they will not be counted. The message at 5483.676 was transmitted out of the 
sequence pattern, but because it cannot be a duplicate, it will be counted. 
Table 11 Situation 1: real data 
42434D 4B85B0 4B8432 
Time Receiver Message Time Receiver Message Time Receiver Message 
5408,406 1 16 5520,409 1 16 5446,364 1 16 
5409,626 1 16 5528,413 1 16 5450,626 4 16 
5418,406 1 16 5530,409 1 16 5456,364 1 16 
5419,626 1 16 5538,364 1 16 5460,626 4 16 
5419,675 1 16 5540,459 1 16 5466,414 1 16 
5428,407 1 16 5548,367 1 16 5470,626 1 16 
5429,626 1 16 5550,409 1 16 5476,364 1 16 
5438,457 1 16 5558,364 4 16 5480,626 1 16 
5439,675 1 16 5560,411 1 16 5487,414 1 16 
5448,407 1 16 5568,363 1 16 5490,626 1 16 
5449,626 1 16 5570,409 1 16 5497,364 1 16 
5458,407 1 16 5578,364 4 16 5500,626 1 16 
5459,626 1 16 5580,41 1 16 5507,414 1 16 
5468,41 1 16 5588,363 4 16 5510,626 1 16 
5469,679 1 16 5590,41 1 16 5517,364 1 16 
5478,408 1 16 5598,363 1 16 5520,626 1 16 
5483,676 1 16 5600,41 1 16 5527,364 1 16 
5488,408 1 16 5608,363 1 16 5530,626 1 16 
5488,626 1 16 5610,41 1 16 5537,367 1 16 
5498,408 1 16 5618,363 1 16 5540,626 1 16 
5498,626 1 16 5620,41 1 16 5547,364 1 16 
5508,408 1 16 5628,365 1 16 5550,676 1 16 
5508,626 1 16 5630,411 1 16 5560,626 1 16 
5508,629 1 16 5638,363 1 16 5567,364 1 16 
5518,409 4 16 5640,411 1 16 5570,627 1 16 
5518,626 1 16 5648,363 4 16 5577,364 1 16 
5528,409 1 16 5650,411 1 16 5580,627 1 16 
5528,629 1 16 5658,363 1 16 5587,413 1 16 
5538,626 1 16 5668,364 1 16 5590,627 1 16 
5543,412 1 16 5670,412 1 16 5597,413 1 16 
5548,626 1 16 5678,364 1 16 5600,627 1 16 
5553,459 1 16 5688,363 4 16 5607,364 1 16 
5558,627 1 16 5698,413 4 16 5610,629 1 16 
5563,409 1 16             
5578,627 1 16             
 
4.2.1.4 Comparison of simulation output with real data 
The comparison of simulation output with real data for this situation is shown in figure 14. 
Since the number of DF17 messages is firmly stated in the standards and shall not change 
according to the aircraft’s mutual positions, it can be used to determine the percentage of 
received messages. In this case it is 93 %. Therefore, approximately 7 % of messages were 
not received by our receivers. That is why we did not receive 107 DF16 messages which 
should have been received according to the standards. The probable cause of the loss of the 
messages is that only 2 out of 4 receivers were operational at the time.  
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Figure 14 Situation 1: comparison of simulation outputs with real data 
4.2.2 Situation 2 
4.2.2.1 Description and initial conditions 
Unlike in situation 1 there are only 2 aircraft in this situation and only one of them has hybrid 
surveillance capability (DF0 as well as DF16 messages were received). Both aircraft are 
equipped with ADS-B (table 12). This means that the aircraft without hybrid surveillance 
capability will interrogate the other aircraft with UF0 messages and will receive DF0 replies. 
The aircraft with hybrid surveillance capability will interrogate with UF0/UF16 messages and 
will receive DF16 replies. The simulation information are stated in table 13. 
Table 12 Situation 2: aircraft information 
 Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 
Type of aircraft A321-211(SL) A321-232(SL) 
Age of aircraft 2 years 3 years 
Company (airline) Aeroflot Russian Airlines Wizz Air 
Mode-S address 424304 471F87 
Altitude 32000 ft 39000 ft 
Velocity 493 kts 489 kts 
X-coordinate 0 12 
Y-coordinate 0 -21 
Bearing 37° 22° 
Transponder capability ES capable ES capable 
Hybrid s. capability HS not capable HS capable 
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Table 13 Situation 2: simulation information 
Date and time 31.03.2018 00:40 CET 
Number of aircraft 2 
Time duration of simulation 3 minutes 
ACAS range 31 NM 
Nominal surveillance rate 5 seconds 
Whisper-shout sequence 6 
 
The situation at 00:40 CET, when the simulation starts as shown on www.planefinder.net, is 
depicted in figure 15 and the same situation at the end of simulation (at 00:43 CET) as 
shown on www.planefinder.net is depicted in figure 16. 
 
Figure 15 Situation 2: initial aircraft position 
 
Figure 16 Situation 2: final aircraft position 
39 
Jakub Nosek – Analysis of real ACAS surveillance parameters using a model 
The aircraft’s initial conditions (altitude, velocity, position, equipment etc.) have been inserted 
to the aircraft model. The output is shown in figure 17. The aircraft flight paths in this figure 
correspond to the real situation shown in figure 15 and figure 16, so the simulation used to 
count the transmitted messages can be run. 
 
Figure 17 Situation 2: simulated aircraft position 
4.2.2.2 Simulation outputs 
Number of all transmitted messages according to the simulation (which is made based on 
standards) distinguished by their types is shown in figure 18. Only one aircraft in this 
situation has hybrid surveillance capability and therefore there are both DF0 and DF16 
messages transmitted in this situation. 
The number of all DF17 messages which were transmitted is shown in figure 19. All DF0 
messages should be transmitted at a nominal rate of once per 5 seconds, and all DF16 
messages once every 60 seconds. 
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Figure 18 Situation 2: simulation outputs 
 
Figure 19 Situation 2: number of DF17 messages 
4.2.2.3 Real data analysis 
All received DF0 and DF16 messages from both aircraft are listed in table 14. As we can 
see, the reply rates correspond to the simulation outputs.  
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Table 14 Situation 2: real data 
424304 471F87 
Time Receiver Message Time Receiver Message 
2439,823 1 16 2406,341 2 0 
2499,823 1 16 2411,311 1 0 
2559,823 1 16 2416,271 2 0 
      2421,171 1 0 
      2426,221 1 0 
      2431,311 1 0 
      2436,361 1 0 
      2441,331 1 0 
      2446,311 4 0 
      2451,201 4 0 
      2456,181 2 0 
      2461,181 4 0 
      2466,232 4 0 
      2471,262 4 0 
      2476,312 1 0 
      2481,212 4 0 
      2486,332 4 0 
      2491,202 1 0 
      2496,182 4 0 
      2501,182 4 0 
      2506,252 4 0 
      2511,312 4 0 
      2516,252 4 0 
      2521,232 4 0 
      2526,182 1 0 
      2531,342 1 0 
      2536,263 4 0 
      2541,243 4 0 
      2546,293 4 0 
      2551,173 4 0 
      2556,233 4 0 
      2561,273 4 0 
      2566,173 4 0 
      2571,263 4 0 
      2576,183 1 0 
      2581,283 1 0 
 
4.2.2.4 Comparison of simulation output with real data 
The comparison of simulation output with real data is presented in figure 20. The DF0 and 
DF16 messages are equal, which means that the surveillance works perfectly according to 
the standards. The nominal interrogation rate of DF0 messages is not firmly defined in 
standards, however the period shall not be higher than 5 seconds. In this case it is evident 
that the ACAS surveillance algorithm is programmed to interrogate every 5 seconds. 
As much as DF0 and DF16 messages are equal, DF17 messages are not. In this situation it 
is a different inequality from the previous one, as the number of real transmitted messages is 
higher than the simulated ones. The ES messages which shall be transmitted in regular time 
intervals when the aircraft is airborne are Aircraft Identification Squitter, Airborne Position 
Squitter and Airborne Velocity Squitter. The transmission time intervals of these ES 
messages, defined in standards, are provided in one of the previous chapters.   
42 
Jakub Nosek – Analysis of real ACAS surveillance parameters using a model 
 
Figure 20 Situation 2: comparison of simulation outputs with real data 
These 3 squitters are the ones that must always be transmitted, but there are other types of 
extended squitters which may be transmitted either at some special occasions (such as 
Event Driven Squitter) or when the aircraft transmits additional information extracted from 
particular BDS register. Since in this case the difference is somewhere around 230 
messages and thus they all cannot be duplicates, there must be other ES messages 
transmitted along with the 3 typical squitters. Hence I have done a deeper analysis of 
received DF17 messages in order to find those extra squitters. 
The type of DF17 messages is provided in the first 5 bits of byte 5 of the message in binary 
code. Since the length of a DF17 message is 112 bits (14 bytes), this information is placed in 
bits 33 to 37. These 5 bits are called Type Code. [2] 
According to DF17 messages analysis, there are 6 types of ES being transmitted by one of 
the aircraft (Aircraft 1) in this situation. The other aircraft transmits the 3 conventional types 
of DF17 as simulated and defined by standards. That means that the first aircraft transmits 3 
additional types of the DF17 message. All 6 types in binary code are illustrated in figure 21 
(the 5 bites that represent Type Code are highlighted). 
 
Figure 21 Situation 2: binary codes of DF17 messages 
These 5 highlighted binary codes are converted to decimal format as shown below: 
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 10011 = 19 which represents Airborne Velocity Message, 
 00100 = 4 which represents Aircraft Identification and Type Message, 
 11101 = 29 which represents Target State and Status Message, 
 11111 = 31 which represents Aircraft Operational Status Message. 
 11100 = 28 which represents Aircraft Status Message 
Hence the 3 additional DF17 types are Target State and Status Message, Aircraft 
Operational Status Message and Aircraft Status Message. The period at which they are 
transmitted according to standards is provided in table 15. [5] 
Table 15 Situation 2: transmission rates of 3 additional DF17 messages 
Type of ES message Period [s] 
Target State and Status Message 1.2 – 1.3  
Aircraft Operational Status Message 
0.7 – 0.9 (when there is no Target State and 
Status Message transmitted) 
2.4 – 2.6 (when Target State and Status 
Message is also transmitted) 
Aircraft Status Message 1 
 
Target State and Status Message 
This message is used to identify whether the aircraft vertical data are available or not, the 
aircraft’s capabilities for providing altitude data, aircraft’s intended altitude and heading, 
whether the aircraft horizontal data are available and other information. [5] 
Aircraft Operational Status Message 
This message is used to report the operational capability of the aircraft such as for whether 
the TCAS is installed and operational or whether the RA or IDENT switch is active etc. [5] 
Aircraft Status Message 
This message is used to provide additional information on aircraft status such as emergency 
status, minimum fuel etc. If its subtype code equals 0, then there is no additional aircraft 
status information being delivered. [5] 
According to RTCA DO-260 technical standard, there are 3 versions of ADS-B - ICAO 
version 0, ICAO version 1 and ICAO version 2. ICAO version 0 was the first ADS-B 
specification defined in 2000. The other versions were defined in 2003 and 2009 
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respectively. The information about a particular version is encoded in Aircraft Operational 
Status Message and therefore every aircraft knows the version of ADS-B by receiving this 
type of DF17 message. However, Aircraft Operational Status Message is only transmitted by 
ADS-B ICAO version 1 and 2 capable aircraft. From this reason, if an aircraft does not 
receive any Aircraft Operational Status Message, it automatically supposes the intruder 
aircraft is equipped with ADS-B ICAO version 0. If it does receive Aircraft Operational Status 
Message, the information about whether the intruder’s ADS-B is ICAO version 1 or ICAO 
version 2 capable is placed in 41-43 ME bits. Taking into account this information and RTCA 
DO-260 document, it is apparent that those 3 additional DF17 messages (Target State and 
Status Message, Aircraft Operational Status Message and Aircraft Status Message) are 
always transmitted by ADS-B ICAO version 1 or 2 capable aircraft. If an aircraft is equipped 
with the oldest ADS-B ICAO version 0, it only transmits the 3 conventional DF17 messages 
(Airborne Position Squitter, Airborne Velocity Squitter and Aircraft Identification Squitter). [2] 
[14] 
If these 3 types of Extended Squitter messages are added to the simulation outputs, the 
comparison of DF17 messages is changed as shown in figure 23. The number of different 
DF17 messages is depicted in figure 22. 
It is apparent that the number of messages is now almost equal. There is just a slight 
difference which shows us that we received almost 91.5 % of all transmitted messages in this 
air traffic situation. 
 
Figure 22 Situation 2: number of all transmitted DF17 messages 
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Figure 23 Situation 2: comparison of DF17 messages 
4.2.3 Situation 3 
4.2.3.1 Description and initial conditions 
There are again 2 aircraft in this situation, both ADS-B equipped (table 16). Only one aircraft 
is ACAS hybrid surveillance capable. Therefore, the aircraft that is not ACAS hybrid 
surveillance capable will transmit DF16 messages as replies to the hybrid surveillance 
validation interrogations. The other aircraft will transmit DF0 messages as replies to nominal 
UF16 interrogations. The simulation information are stated in table 17. 
Table 16 Situation 3: aircraft information 
 Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 
Type of aircraft A320-232 B777-FS2 
Age of aircraft 9 years 4 years 
Company (airline) Wizz Air Federal Express 
Mode-S address 471EA5 AC5868 
Altitude 37000 ft 29000 ft 
Velocity 462 kts 509 kts 
X-coordinate 0 28 
Y-coordinate 0 -13.5 
Bearing 3° 14° 
Transponder capability ES capable ES capable 
Hybrid s. capability HS capable HS not capable 
 
 
1744 
1908 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Real Data Simulation
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
Comparison of DF17 messages 
46 
Jakub Nosek – Analysis of real ACAS surveillance parameters using a model 
Table 17 Situation 3: simulation information 
Date and time 18.03.2018 00:40 CET 
Number of aircraft 2 
Time duration of simulation 5 minutes 
ACAS range 32 NM 
Nominal surveillance rate 5 seconds 
Whisper-shout sequence 6 
 
The situation at 00:40 CET, when the simulation starts as shown on www.planefinder.net, is 
depicted in figure 24, and the same situation at the end of simulation time (at 00:45 CET) as 
shown on www.planefinder.net is depicted in figure 25. 
 
Figure 24 Situation 3: initial aircraft position 
 
Figure 25 Situation 3: final aircraft position 
The aircraft’s initial conditions (altitude, velocity, position, equipment etc.) have been inserted 
to the aircraft model. The output is shown in figure 26. The aircraft flight paths in this figure 
correspond to the real situation shown in figure 24 and figure 25, so the simulation used to 
count the transmitted messages can be run. 
47 
Jakub Nosek – Analysis of real ACAS surveillance parameters using a model 
 
Figure 26 Situation 3: simulated aircraft position 
4.2.3.2 Simulation outputs 
Number of all transmitted messages according to the simulation (which is made based on 
standards) distinguished by their type is shown in figure 27. As already mentioned, only one 
aircraft in this situation has hybrid surveillance capability and therefore both DF0 and DF16 
messages were transmitted in this situation. 
 
Figure 27 Situation 3: simulation outputs 
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The number of all DF17 messages which were transmitted is shown in figure 28. All DF0 
messages should be transmitted at nominal rate, and all DF16 messages once every 60 
seconds, so these surveillance rates are the same as in the previous situation. 
 
Figure 28 Situation 3: number of DF17 messages 
4.2.3.3 Real data analysis 
All received DF0 and DF16 messages from both aircraft are listed in table 18. Newly in this 
situation, there are messages in the table, which are written in red. These messages were, 
after an analysis of their binary codes, identified as replies to acquisition interrogations. 
Acquisition interrogations are DF0 interrogations with AQ field equal to 1 and are transmitted 
to acquire a range of lately identified aircraft. The replies to these acquisition interrogations 
are identified by analysis of their RI field as shown in figure 29. If the first bit of this field (14th 
bit of the message) equals 1, it means this is a reply to acquisition interrogation. Hence, 
there must have been another aircraft in the situation which was not, for some reason, visible 
on www.planefinder.net and which suddenly got in the detection range of the 2 analyzed 
aircraft. In some cases these RI=1 replies are followed by one or more RI=0 messages. This 
will be further analyzed at the end of this chapter. [1] 
 
Figure 29 Situation 3: binary code of DF0 acquisition reply message 
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Table 18 Situation 3: real data 
AC5868 471EA5 
Time Receiver Message Time Receiver Message 
2447,4664 1 16 2419,1832 4 0 
2507,4663 1 16 2424,2534 4 0 
2567,4661 1 16 2429,2035 4 0 
2618,433 4 0 2434,2537 4 0 
2627,466 1 16 2439,1938 4 0 
2650,45 4 0 2444,114 4 0 
2685,4758 4 0 2449,0941 4 0 
2687,4657 4 16 2454,2443 4 0 
2696,4154 1 0 2459,1545 1 0 
      2464,2446 1 0 
      2469,2448 1 0 
      2474,2049 1 0 
      2484,2253 1 0 
      2489,2354 1 0 
      2499,1657 4 0 
      2504,1559 1 0 
      2509,2661 4 0 
      2514,1562 4 0 
      2524,2766 4 0 
      2529,1867 4 0 
      2534,1769 4 0 
      2539,147 4 0 
      2544,1972 4 0 
      2549,2373 4 0 
      2554,1175 4 0 
      2559,2577 1 0 
      2564,1678 1 0 
      2569,218 4 0 
      2574,1181 4 0 
      2579,2183 4 0 
      2584,2485 4 0 
      2589,2086 4 0 
      2594,2488 1 0 
      2599,169 4 0 
      2604,1591 1 0 
      2609,1993 4 0 
      2614,0994 1 0 
      2619,2696 1 0 
      2621,4592 1 0 
      2624,4584 1 0 
      2628,1342 1 0 
      2628,182 1 0 
      2629,1799 1 0 
      2634,2001 4 0 
      2636,4332 4 0 
      2638,1822 1 0 
      2638,2322 1 0 
      2639,2077 4 0 
      2640,1323 1 0 
      2640,1821 1 0 
      2640,4193 4 0 
      2642,1321 1 0 
      2643,7685 1 0 
      2644,1779 4 0 
      2649,1106 4 0 
      2651,4234 1 0 
      2654,2307 4 0 
      2655,428 4 0 
      2659,2409 4 0 
      2661,1822 1 0 
      2664,141 4 0 
      2669,1712 4 0 
      2673,4287 4 0 
      2679,2115 4 0 
      2682,4656 1 0 
      2684,1817 1 0 
      2689,2519 1 0 
      2691,1324 1 0 
      2692,769 1 0 
      2693,1324 1 0 
      2695,152 4 0 
      2696,4277 4 0 
      2700,1322 4 0 
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4.2.3.4 Comparison of simulation output with real data 
The comparison of simulation outputs with real data is shown in figure 30. Since only 2 
receivers were operational at the time, taking into account the number of DF17 messages, 
only approximately 81 % of messages were received. DF0 replies to acquisition 
interrogations are not counted in the figure. 
 
Figure 30 Situation 3: comparison of simulation outputs with real data 
4.2.4 Situation 4 
4.2.4.1  Description and initial conditions 
2 aircraft in this situation have the same equipment as the aircraft in situation 2 and 3 (table 
20). Hence the surveillance between them will be done as described in previous 2 situations. 
The simulation information are stated in table 19.  
Table 19 Situation 4: simulation information 
Date and time 24.03.2018 03:46 CET 
Number of aircraft 2 
Time duration of simulation 3 minutes 
ACAS range 31 NM 
Nominal surveillance rate 5 seconds 
Whisper-shout sequence 6 
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Table 20 Situation 4: aircraft information 
 Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 
Type of aircraft B747-406M A350-941 
Age of aircraft 16 years 2 months 
Company (airline) KLM Royal Dutch Airline Malaysia Airlines 
Mode-S address 484175 75044B 
Altitude 36000 ft 40000 ft 
Velocity 496 kts 489 kts 
X-coordinate 0 26 
Y-coordinate 0 16 
Bearing 145° 159° 
Transponder capability ES capable ES capable 
Hybrid s. capability HS not capable HS capable 
 
The situation at 03:46 CET when the simulation starts as shown on www.planefinder.net is 
depicted in figure 31 and the same situation at the end of simulation (at 03:49 CET) as 
shown on www.planefinder.net is depicted in figure 32. 
 
Figure 31 Situation 4: initial aircraft position 
 
Figure 32 Situation 4: final aircraft position 
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The aircraft’s initial conditions (altitude, velocity, position, equipment etc.) have been inserted 
to the aircraft model. The output is shown in figure 33. The aircraft flight paths in this figure 
correspond to the real situation shown in figure 31 and figure 32, so the simulation used to 
count the transmitted messages can be run. 
 
Figure 33 Situation 4: simulated aircraft position 
4.2.4.2 Simulation outputs 
Number of all transmitted messages according to the simulation (which is made based on 
standards) distinguished by type is shown in figure 34. As well as in the previous 2 situations, 
only one aircraft in this situation has hybrid surveillance capability and therefore both DF0 
and DF16 messages are transmitted. 
The number of all DF17 messages which were transmitted is shown in figure 35. All DF0 
messages should be transmitted at a nominal rate of once per 5 seconds and all DF16 
messages once every 10 seconds. 
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Figure 34 Situation 4: simulation outputs 
 
Figure 35 Situation 4: number of DF17 messages 
4.2.4.3 Real data analysis 
All received DF0 and DF16 messages from both aircraft are listed in table 21. Since Aircraft 
1 (484175) has no hybrid surveillance capability, only DF0 messages were received from 
Aircraft 2 (75044B). All these DF0 messages were transmitted at nominal rate which, in this 
case, is again 5 seconds. One message is missing from the sequence (it was not received at 
any of our receivers although it must have been transmitted) and thus it will be manually 
added to the final number of transmitted messages.  
There are 6 messages with no background color in the table that were received from both 
aircraft. These messages do not belong to any sequence pattern and they are not replies to 
acquisition interrogations according to their RI field. Therefore it is hard to determine why 
1512 
36 18 54 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
DF17 DF0 DF16 UF0/UF16
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
Message type 
Simulation outputs 
720 
720 
72 
Number of Extended Squitter messages 
Airborne Position Squitter Airborne Velocity Squitter Aircraft Identification Squitter
54 
Jakub Nosek – Analysis of real ACAS surveillance parameters using a model 
they were transmitted. However since they were received, they will be added to the final 
number of transmitted DF0 messages. 
Transmission rate of DF16 validation messages received from Aircraft 1 is 10 seconds, 
which is exactly the same rate as described in standards. 
Table 21 Situation 4: real data 
75044B 484175 
Time Receiver Message Time Receiver Message 
13561,65 4 0 13566,27 4 16 
13566,7 4 0 13576,32 1 16 
13571,63 4 0 13586,27 4 16 
13576,58 4 0 13596,27 1 16 
13581,58 4 0 13599,15 4 0 
13586,6 4 0 13606,27 1 16 
13588,58 4 0 13616,27 4 16 
13591,69 4 0 13626,32 1 16 
13595,53 4 0 13636,27 1 16 
13596,65 4 0 13646,32 1 16 
13601,54 4 0 13649,21 1 0 
13602,15 4 0 13656,27 1 16 
13606,54 1 0 13666,27 1 16 
13611,71 1 0 13676,27 1 16 
13616,75 1 0 13686,32 4 16 
13621,57 4 0 13696,27 4 16 
13626,66 4 0 13706,37 4 16 
13631,58 4 0 13716,27 1 16 
13636,63 1 0 13726,27 1 16 
13641,62 1 0 13736,32 1 16 
13646,69 1 0       
13649,2 4 0       
13651,65 4 0       
13656,55 1 0       
13661,53 1 0       
13666,63 1 0       
13671,71 1 0       
13676,6 1 0       
13681,55 1 0       
13691,7 1 0       
13696,62 4 0       
13701,58 1 0       
13706,71 4 0       
13711,56 4 0       
13716,69 4 0       
13721,7 4 0       
13726,66 4 0       
13731,64 4 0       
13736,63 1 0       
 
4.2.4.4 Comparison of simulation output with real data 
The comparison of simulation outputs with real data is presented in figure 36. As we can see, 
the count of DF16 messages is equal. The number of DF0 messages is higher than it should 
be according to the standards. This is caused by the DF0 messages which were received out 
of the sequence pattern as described in one of the previous paragraphs. If those messages 
would not have been received, the number of DF0 would be the same. 
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The number of received DF17 messages is much higher than it should be according to the 
simulation output. Hence a further analysis of these messages to explain this inequality must 
have been done. As well as in situation 2 I have analyzed the binary codes of the received 
messages and found out that there are the same 3 additional types of extended squitter 
messages on top of the 3 types which must be transmitted in every situation. These 3 
additional types of messages were transmitted only by Aircraft 2 and they are: 
 Target State and Status Message, 
 Aircraft Operational Status Message and 
 Aircraft Status Message. 
These types of DF17 messages were already described in situation 2 so as well as in this 
situation we can suppose the aircraft is equipped with ADS-B ICAO version 1 or 2. 
 
Figure 36 Situation 4: comparison of simulation outputs with real data 
The number of simulated Extended Squitter messages after adding the Target State and 
Status Message, Aircraft Operational Status Message and Aircraft Status Message are 
shown in figure 37. 
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Figure 37 Situation 4: number of all DF17 messages 
 
Figure 38 Situation 4: comparison of DF17 messages 
From figure 38 it is apparent that we received more than 95 % of all transmitted messages. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 ACAS surveillance range 
Technical documentation describes the Maximum ACAS surveillance range as follows: 
“TCAS II can simultaneously track up to 30 aircraft, within a nominal range of 14 NM for 
Mode A/C targets and 30 NM for Mode S targets. In implementations that allow for the use of 
the Mode S extended squitter, the nominal surveillance range may be increased beyond the 
nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes.” [1] 
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In all situations that had been analyzed, the ACAS surveillance range was higher than 30 
NM. In situation 1, the range was even 40 NM and it is possible that it would have been even 
more than 40 NM if the simulation time had been longer. For this reason I have decided to 
analyze this parameter on another situation so I can confirm the maximum ACAS 
surveillance range in low density air traffic is much higher than stated in standards.  
The situation is shown in figure 39. 
 
Figure 39 Aircraft situation used for ACAS range determination 
The situation starts on the 1st of April at 01:22 CET. I have analyzed the real messages 
which were received from the aircraft circled in blue and found out that the first replies to 
interrogations from the aircraft circled in red were sent after 134 seconds (at 01:24:14). The 
first transmitted replies are shown in table 22.  After analyzing the binary codes of the 
messages, I have identified that the first 3 messages were replies to acquisition 
transmissions and thereafter the nominal surveillance at a rate of once per 5 seconds 
started.  
Table 22 Real data for ACAS range determination 
505C6A 
Time  Receiver Message 
5055,77 1 0 
5057,73 1 0 
5067,7 1 0 
5069,64 1 0 
5070,71 1 0 
5075,65 1 0 
5080,75 1 0 
5085,62 1 0 
5090,63 1 0 
 
I have used the MATLAB simulation to find out the range between these 2 aircraft at time 
01:24:14 when the transmission starts. The aircraft flight paths are shown in figure 40. The 
simulation time was 134 seconds and thus the aircraft position at the end of simulation is the 
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position when the interrogation starts. According to the simulation, this is almost 65 NM. 
Therefore I can confirm the ACAS surveillance range in low air traffic density is much higher 
than it is defined in standards. 
 
Figure 40 Simulated aircraft flight paths for ACAS range determination 
4.3.2   ACAS nominal surveillance rate 
If the aircraft (both own and intruder aircraft) are above FL180 and the value of TAU is higher 
than 60 seconds, the nominal surveillance rate shall be at least 5 seconds. 
“All intruders shall be interrogated at least once every five surveillance update intervals. An 
intruder with a TAU value of equal to or less than 60 seconds shall be interrogated at the 
nominal surveillance update rate of once every surveillance update interval. An intruder with 
a TAU value greater than 60 seconds shall be interrogated at a rate of no more than once 
every five surveillance update intervals if: 
a. the tracked barometric altitude of own aircraft is less than 18,000 ft, and 
b. the tracked altitude of the intruder aircraft is less than 18,000 ft.” [1] 
Therefore, in standards the surveillance rate in this kind of situation is not firmly defined and 
the decision is left on the manufacturer. In all analyzed situations, there were 4 aircraft which 
met the criteria of at least once per 5 seconds interrogation rate. All of these aircraft 
interrogated exactly at the 5 second rate and hence I am able to say that the nominal rate 
chosen by manufacturers in most of the cases is 5 seconds.  
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4.3.3 DF17 messages 
If an aircraft is equipped with ADS-B, it shall regularly transmit 3 types of DF17 (extended 
squitter) messages. These are Aircraft Identification Squitter Message, Airborne Velocity 
Squitter Message and Airborne Position Squitter Message. In the analyzed situations, there 
were 9 ADS-B equipped aircraft in total from which the extended squitter messages were 
received. However, there were another 3 types of DF17 messages which were received from 
2 out of the 9 aircraft. These messages were Target State and Status Message, Aircraft 
Operational Status Message and Aircraft Status Message. The transmission rates and other 
information about these messages were described in the previous paragraphs. After a 
deeper analysis which had been done, I found out there are 3 versions of ADS-B. If an 
aircraft is equipped with ADS-B ICAO version 1 or 2, then it regularly transmits 6 types of 
DF17 messages. Only aircraft which are equipped with ADS-B ICAO version 0 transmit 3 
types of DF17 messages. Taking into account this information I am able to say that 78 % of 
all analyzed aircraft in this work were ADS-B ICAO version 0 equipped, which is the oldest 
version from 2000 and only 22 % of all aircraft were either ADS-B ICAO version 1 or ADS-B 
ICAO version 2 equipped. Those results are based on a very small sample of data (only 9 
aircraft) however it pretty well corresponds to the analysis which had been done by another 
CTU student in his Master’s thesis that was focused on ADS-B. He had analyzed more than 
8500 aircraft and found out that 76 % of all aircraft were ADS-B ICAO version 0 equipped. 
[14] 
4.3.4 UF0/DF0 acquisition messages 
There were 2 situations in the analysis where the acquisition messages had been 
transmitted. These were situation 3 and then the situation which was used in this chapter to 
determine the maximum ACAS surveillance range. 
“The total number of acquisition interrogations addressed to a single target shall not exceed 
three within a single surveillance update cycle and a total of nine within the first six 
surveillance update cycles.” 
“If additional attempts are made to acquire the target, they shall conform to the pattern 
described in the requirement above for the first attempt except that: 
a. On the second and third attempt, only one interrogation is made during each single 
surveillance update interval; and in the absence of valid replies, six interrogations are 
transmitted during the first six surveillance update intervals. 
b. Any further attempts consist of a single interrogation during the entire six surveillance 
update intervals.” [1] 
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Referring to the example in the situation used to determine the ACAS surveillance range 
(table 18), we can see that 3 acquisition replies were sent. The first 2 messages were 
transmitted in the same surveillance update interval, while the last one in a different one. In 
the table there is one message which is not the acquisition reply nor a message from the 
surveillance rate pattern. The presence of this message can be probably explained as 
follows.   
“Following successful receipt of a valid acquisition reply from an airborne aircraft, one or 
more additional interrogations shall be transmitted to the target in order to confirm the 
reliability of the altitude data and the altitude quantization bit and to determine whether to 
establish track.” [1] 
The example in situation 3 is not that clear. There is quite a lot of acquisition reply messages 
in table 14. This was probably caused by an aircraft flying at the boundary of the ACAS 
surveillance range of the 2 aircraft being analyzed. Anyway, all the acquisition messages as 
well as the additional interrogations conform to the citation above and thus it is possible to 
say that the transmission of DF0 acquisition messages in these 2 examples is in conformity 
with the standards. 
4.3.5 Aircraft equipment 
If we take only the 4 situations described in the previous chapter into account, 9 aircraft were 
analyzed. The age of these aircraft ranges between 2 months and 18 years. It is still not 
mandatory for aircraft operators in Europe to have their aircraft equipped with ADS-B, 
however this will become mandatory in 2020.  
 “5.   Operators shall ensure that by 7 June 2020 at the latest: 
(b) aircraft with a maximum certified take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg or having a maximum 
cruising true airspeed capability greater than 250 knots, operating flights referred to in Article 
2(2), are equipped with secondary surveillance radar transponders having, in addition to the 
capabilities set out in Part A of Annex II, the capabilities set out in Part B of that Annex;” [9] 
[10] 
In spite of this fact, all of these aircraft (100 %) were ADS-B equipped. 
6 of the analyzed aircraft were hybrid surveillance capable (66.7 %). According to all the 
concerned aircraft, the ACAS hybrid surveillance capability does not depend on the age of 
aircraft. Hence it cannot be said that most of the newly manufactured aircraft are ACAS 
hybrid surveillance capable. Anyway, nowadays it is not at all mandatory for commercial 
aircraft to have ACAS hybrid surveillance capability. 
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“Hybrid surveillance is a method that decreases the number of Mode S surveillance 
interrogations made by an aircraft's TCAS II unit. This feature, new to TCAS II version 7.1, 
may be included as optional functionality in TCAS II units.” [4]  
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5 Proposal of amendments 
to the official ACAS 
surveillance algorithms 
In this chapter I would like to propose amendments to the official ACAS surveillance 
algorithms. The objective of the amendments is to lower the 1030/1090 MHz radio frequency 
saturation. The safety aspects of these amendments will be taken into account but it is not 
the scope of this work to prove them using a model or any other kind of sophisticated 
approach. Therefore the results of this chapter should be considered only as a guidance of 
how the surveillance algorithms could be amended in order to lower the frequency saturation. 
A further and deeper study of all the aspects would have to be done to confirm that these 
amendments could be safely deployed into the real systems.  
The amendments will be based on the analysis which was done in previous chapters. It is 
necessary to say that the real surveillance algorithms were invented by experts in this field 
and they also have been tested many times before they were deployed. For this reason it is 
not easy to suggest changes which would enhance the system’s functionality.  
I would like to introduce one major amendment that I think would be beneficial for lowering 
the frequency saturation. As mentioned earlier in this document, the surveillance rate of 
UF0/UF16 hybrid surveillance validation messages depends on equations (VIII) and (IX). 
Referring to these equations, the surveillance rate can be either once per second, once per 
10 seconds or once per 60 seconds. On the other hand, if the aircraft are not equipped with 
hybrid surveillance capable ACAS, the surveillance rate is either once per second, once per 
5 seconds or once per 10 seconds, depending on the conditions described in previous 
chapters. It is evident that the surveillance rates in these 2 types of interrogation (once per 
second) are identical when the aircraft are close enough, so there is a higher risk of collision. 
However, if the aircraft are more distant so there is no immediate risk of collision, and this 
happens in most of the cases, the surveillance rates are quite different. In case of hybrid 
surveillance, there is less interrogation. This is understandable since the aircraft get the 
position information regularly in the extended squitter messages. Nevertheless, I believe that 
the surveillance rates could be set to interrogate less frequently also in case of aircraft which 
are not hybrid surveillance capable. I would propose to set the interrogation rates according 
to equations (XI), (XII) and (XIII). 
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Where: 
a is intruder altitude separation in feet. 
ȧ is altitude rate in feet/second. 
r is intruder slant range in NM. 
ṙ is range rate in NM/second. 
If equation (XI) is met, that means that both equations in the brackets are higher than 80 
seconds, the surveillance rate is once in 10 seconds. Since the aircraft would be far enough 
from each other in this case, this surveillance seems to be sufficient and safe even without 
position information received in extended squitter messages. 
If equation (XII) is met, the surveillance rate is once in 5 seconds. Finally, if the last equation 
(XIII) is met, the surveillance rate is once per second.   
Another change would be if the aircraft altitude separation was higher than 10000 feet. In 
such a case, I would propose to set the surveillance rate to once per 15 seconds, compared 
to once in 10 seconds as it is set in systems which are nowadays deployed.  
The consequences of these amendments will be now analyzed and compared in an 
example. 
5.1 Example 
I will use the MATLAB simulation to simulate a fictional air traffic situation. The same 
situation will be simulated with the standardized ACAS surveillance algorithms as well as 
with the amended algorithms described in this chapter. The results will be compared so the 
effect of the amendments on the frequency saturation can be discussed. 
The air traffic situation consists of 5 aircraft. Their initial conditions and equipment are stated 
in table 23. The duration of the simulation is 180 seconds, the ACAS surveillance range was 
set to 40 NM and the nominal surveillance for simulation using standardized algorithms is 5 
seconds. The situation (aircraft flights) is illustrated in figure 41.  
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Table 23 Aircraft initial conditions 
Initial conditions Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 Aircraft 3 Aircraft 4 Aircraft 5 
x-coordinate 0 25 -27 8 5 
y-coordinate 0 0 -10 12 10 
Altitude [ft.] 41000 36000 37000 31000 20000 
Velocity [kt.] 480 450 389 415 376 
Heading 0 180 10 17 197 
ADS-B • • • • • 
HS  •  •  
 
 
Figure 41 Situation overview 
The results are presented in figure 42. Since hybrid surveillance algorithms were not 
amended, only the number of transmitted DF0 messages is different. As apparent, if the 
system works according to the amended ACAS surveillance algorithms, the number of 
transmitted DF0 messages is lower. In case of this fictional air traffic situation the number of 
DF0 messages is lowered by 45 % which fundamentally relieves the 1030/1090 MHz radio 
frequency saturation.   
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Figure 42 Comparison of simulation outputs 
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6 Conclusion 
The volume of air traffic is constantly rising and this trend is not forecast to change in the 
nearest future if there are no unexpected circumstances. Hence it is important that the 
communication, navigation and surveillance systems maintain their functionality at the 
highest safety level and with the highest reliability also in dense areas. 
The surveillance infrastructure in aviation mostly uses only one common radio frequency 
band, which is RF 1030/1090 MHz and thus the vast majority of transmissions for 
surveillance purposes are sent via this frequency. Since air traffic in some areas is becoming 
extremely dense, it may happen that this RF gets oversaturated. As a result of this saturation 
the air traffic controllers could simply lose the aircraft on the radar screen which could lead to 
an accident. 
The transmissions which are sent via RF 1030/1090 MHz can be divided as ground-to-air 
transmissions, air-to-ground transmissions and air-to-air transmissions. The topic of this work 
was airborne collision avoidance system, which uses air-to-air messages to interrogate other 
aircraft in order to avoid a possible collision. 
The aim of this Master’s thesis was to analyze real ACAS surveillance parameters in order to 
find out whether the real system works according to the technical standards and how much 
the ACAS air-to-air messages contribute to the overall radio frequency saturation. The 
transmission rates of these messages are standardized and made in a way that the system 
has the position data of all aircraft in vicinity long before a possible collision is detected. 
However, not all transmission rates and other surveillance parameters are firmly defined in 
the standards and thus it is left to the system’s manufacturer to set up those parameters. In 
this work I created a MATLAB/Simulink simulation of the ACAS surveillance function using 
surveillance parameters based on the standards. Next, I analyzed real ACAS messages that 
have been received by ADS-B receivers owned by the Czech Technical University in Prague. 
This simulation allowed me to simulate real air traffic situations and therefore I could 
compare the simulation outputs with real messages received by the ADS-B receivers. Using 
the compared data I was able to discuss whether the real surveillance function really works 
according to the standards, and point out some probable differences, if any. I could also 
analyze the parameters not firmly defined in standards. In this work I described 4 air traffic 
situations in detail, but the analysis was based on more situations. However, the length 
constraints of this thesis did not allow for them to be commented. 
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The simulation part consists of an aircraft model created in Simulink, and the ACAS 
surveillance function programmed in MATLAB. The aircraft model sends its position data to 
the surveillance function, where this data is used to define ranges among all the modeled 
aircraft and also to define surveillance rates. The outputs of the simulation are plots showing 
the number of different transmitted messages during the entire simulation.  
Having applied the approach described in the previous paragraphs I was able to analyze 
some of the ACAS surveillance parameters and finally present the results. Those parameters 
were ACAS surveillance range, nominal surveillance rate, transmission rates of UF0/DF0 
acquisition messages, types of transmitted DF17 messages and I also tried to find out 
whether there is a relation between the aircraft age and its equipment used for air-to-air 
interrogations. While some of the results were quite surprising, such as ACAS surveillance 
range which was found to be much higher than the one defined in standards or different 
ICAO versions of ADS-B and its corresponding DF17 messages which were transmitted, 
some of the parameters just confirmed my expectations, such as the nominal surveillance 
rate, which was found to be 5 seconds even if the standard does not firmly define it.   
In the last part of this Master’s thesis I tried to suggest some amendments to the official 
ACAS surveillance algorithms which could be potentially beneficial for lowering the 
1030/1090 MHz radio frequency saturation. I also added those changes into the MATLAB 
code so I could compare the number of transmitted messages to the current surveillance 
algorithms. The results were then presented in the form of a graph. 
Regardless of how much I tried to make the aircraft model and the surveillance function 
simulation realistic, it was necessary to apply a couple of simplifications. In case of the 
aircraft model the applied simplifications are not crucial for the functioning of the ACAS 
surveillance algorithms. The simplifications to the surveillance function simulation must be 
taken into account when simulating a complex air traffic situation, as there are two 
parameters which are not included and this could influence the results. The simulation does 
not include traffic and resolution advisories and it does not have a script for situations when 
the aircraft are too close to each other, in which case the surveillance rate must change to 
once per second. Nonetheless, when working on this thesis and analyzing the real data, I did 
not encounter any situation which would require the simulation to have these scripts. 
Anyway, in some other situations this could be required.  
This work brings forward some important ACAS surveillance parameters which should be 
deeply analyzed and possibly amended in order to maintain the RF 1030/1090 MHz 
unsaturated and safe for its usage in the future. It is based on the theoretical description 
already done in my Bachelor’s thesis, and I believe that also this thesis can be used as a 
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basis for further works. Especially the parameters such as ACAS surveillance range and 
UF0/DF0 acquisition messages would require further analysis in more situations. There was 
not enough space in this work to analyze all those parameters in a sufficient number of air 
traffic situations, as each of the parameters would require to be studied in a single work.  
I also believe that the MATLAB simulation can be used by other students working on this 
project in the future, e.g. for analyzing purposes of the parameters stated in the previous 
paragraph. It is possible to use the aircraft Simulink model separately for other purposes and 
thus it can serve as a basis for different aviation simulations. 
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10 Attachments 
All attachments are provided on attached CD. This CD includes the following files: 
ACAS_simulation.zip 
 Simulink aircraft model AC_model_simulink.slx 
 Script initial_conditions.m 
 Script main_file.m 
 Function range_calculation.m 
 Function modeS_AQ.m 
 Function modeS_ES.m 
 Function modeS_ADSBHS.m 
 Function ModeC.m 
 Function other_messages.m 
 Function Number_of_messages.m 
 Function aircraft_plot.m 
 Function messages_plot.m 
ACAS_simulation_AMENDED.zip 
 Simulink aircraft model AC_model_simulink.slx 
 Script initial_conditions.m 
 Script main_file.m 
 Function range_calculation.m 
 Function modeS_AQ.m 
 Function modeS_ES.m 
 Function modeS_ADSBHS.m 
 Function ModeC.m 
 Function other_messages.m 
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 Function Number_of_messages.m 
 Function aircraft_plot.m 
 Function messages_plot.m 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
